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Near the end of the Nineteenth Century a Prussian 
woman arrived at her local telegraph office with a bowl of 
sauerkraut she wanted sent to her son.  She insisted that, 
if soldiers could be sent to the front by telegraph, certainly 
her sauerkraut could be sent the same way.  (Standage, 
1998) 
The Prussian woman thought that communication 
and transportation could coincide.  She may have been 
correct.  In 1993 an IBM scientist, Charles H. Bennett, 
predicted that quantum teleportation is possible, but only if 
the original object is destroyed.  More recently, in October, 
1998, Caltech scientist H. Jeff Kimble succeeded in 
instantaneously transporting information contained in the 
quantum state of a photon one meter across a lab bench 
without it traversing any physical medium in between.  
Kimble and his colleagues used an extremely delicate 
quantum mechanical phenomenon, ”quantum 
entanglement.”  Kimble’s findings suggest that 
teleportation of the sort depicted in the Star Trek television 
series and movies is theoretically possible. 
In science fiction and science fact teleportation of 
a human being would involve a person stepping into a 
send-booth and having every single atom in his body and 
its location encoded.  His compete physical structure 
would be stored in a memory buffer.  The code of his 
structure would be sent, presumably by quantum 
mechanical means, to a remote receive-booth.  At the 
reception end, the person’s body would be reconstructed 
according to the encoded information.  A very slow way of 
doing this would be to also convey the matter from his 
prototype body to the receive-booth by snail mail.  
However, since he was completely disassembled back in 
the send-booth, we need not be fussy about what matter is 
used for the reconstitution.  To optimize speed, local 
matter could be recruited for the purpose of reconstructing 
his body at the reception site.  Initially this seems to be an 
extremely rapid means of transportation.  However, 
teleportation amounts to transportation only in the event 
that personal identity is preserved.  Whether the person 
who emerges from the receive-booth is the numerically 
same individual who entered the send-booth depends on 
the concept of ”person” we employ. 
Cyberneticist Norbert Wiener claimed that matter 
does not matter.  He suggested that a person is not a 
static entity, but a pattern whose instantiation is constantly 
changing.  Wiener said, ”The individuality of the body is 
that of a flame rather than that of a stone, of a form rather 
than of a bit of substance.”  Regarding the prospect of 
teleportation, he added:   
The pattern of the body can be regarded as a 
message that is in principle capable of being coded, 
transmitted, and then translated back into its original 
form, as sight and sound patterns may be transmitted 
by radio and translated back into sound and picture.  
Hence there is no absolute distinction between the 
types of transmission which we can use for sending a 
telegram from country to country and the types of 
transmission which at least are theoretically possible 
for transmitting a living organism such as a human 
being.  (Wiener 1954, 91.) 
If a person is simply a pattern, then it looks as 
though teleportation could be a viable form of 
transportation.  Some practical difficulties exist.  For 
example, information theory dictates that, whenever large 
amounts of information are transferred from one location to 
another, some bits of information are inevitably changed or 
distorted.  This makes it unlikely (or impossible) that the 
individual decoded and reconstituted in the receive-booth 
is exactly the same in all respects as the one who entered 
the send-booth.  Even if we disregard the change in 
location and the discontinuity, if the received person differs 
from the sent person in any respect, no matter how minute, 
then Leibniz’s principle of identity of indiscernibles 
indicates they are not the same. 
A second practical difficulty concerns the 
information stored in the memory buffer.  Physicist 
Lawrence M. Kraus contends that transporters are the 
least plausible technological devices depicted on Star 
Trek, because of the daunting amount of memory that 
would be required to store all the information regarding the 
atomic structure of a human body.  About 1028 kilobytes 
would be needed to store a human pattern in a memory 
buffer.  It is difficult to imagine how this much information 
could be stored.  Moreover,  
The fastest digital information transfer mechanisms at 
present can move somewhat less than about 100 
megabytes per second.  At this rate, it would take 
about 2000 times the present age of the universe 
(assuming an approximate age of 10 billion years) to 
write the data describing a human pattern to tape!  
(Krause, 1996, 76-77) 
Even if these practical difficulties could be 
overcome, personal identity problems remain.  Recent 
philosophical accounts of personal identity have become 
increasingly sophisticated compared to the treatment by 
John Locke.  For example,  Robert Nozick’s closest-
continuer schema for numerical identity is a means for 
keeping track of an individual’s identity over time.  
According to Nozick’s schema an object can be thought of 
as chopped up into time-slices; each slice is an object-at-
a-time.  Time-slices of objects have causal descendants, 
or continuers, as they undergo changes.  Nozick suggests 
that we are willing to call the closest-continuer the same 
object as its ancestor based upon its qualitative 
similarities.  If I replace a part in my watch, I consider my 
repaired watch as the same one I had before, because of 
similarities and because it is the closest continuer of my 
old one.  Even if I have my watch completely disassembled 
for cleaning and then reassembled afterward, I regard my 
cleaned, reassembled watch as being the same as my old, 
dirty one.  Nozick supposes that his schema works as well 
for people as it does with watches.  Since the human body 
replaces most of its cells, and presumably most of its 
matter every five to seven years or so, Nozick’s closest-
continuer schema provides a justification for saying that I 
am the same person who was born in Chicago fifty-seven 
years ago even if none of the cells now present in my 
body, or none of the matter that now comprises my body, 
was there when I was an infant. 
Richard Hanley uses Nozick’s schema to defend 
the claim that personal identity is retained when a person 
goes through a Star Trek transporter.  (Hanley 1997, 123-
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162) However, a watch is different from a person.  A 
disassembled watch can be reassembled with no 
significant differences being imposed on it.  A 
disassembled person dies.  Moreover, the generation of 
duplicates by a transporter presents no great difficulties 
with respect to a watch.  Transporter duplication of objects 
could be a benefit; it might be an efficient means of mass 
production.  While transporter duplication of persons could 
be an alternative to cloning, the possibility of duplication of 
human bodies precludes the possibility of retaining 
personal identity.  A watch cannot socially ”meet” its 
duplicate.  A person can meet his doppelgänger in a 
transporter scenario. 
Transporters provide the illusion of transportation. 
A working transporter would not be a means of extremely 
rapid conveyance; it would be a killing and duplicating 
machine, comparable to a FAX machine in which in 
original document is automatically destroyed.  Consider a 
scenario: 
Transporter Scenario 1: 
 Chuck steps into the send-booth of a 
teletransporter in Kirchberg. 
 Chuck is encoded and disintegrated in the 
send-booth. 
 An exact replica of Chuck, Dopple-Chuck, 
steps out of the receive-booth on Altair-4. 
 Dopple-Chuck is completely similar to the 
individual who entered the send-booth regarding both 
physical and psychological characteristics (for instance, he 
has the same fingerprints, DNA structure, and stomach 
contents;  he also has the same memories and 
personality). 
 It seems to Dopple-Chuck as though he is 
the same person who entered the send-booth. 
 A deputation of colleagues is sent to Altair-
4 by conventional means.  They find that Dopple-Chuck is 
exactly as though he had traveled from Kirchberg to Altair-
4 by conventional means. 
Notice that you could use a functional transporter 
to commit suicide by turning off everything except the 
disintegrate feature.  To demonstrate that a working 
transporter would not retain numerical identity of a person, 
activate all the features except disintegration so the 
prototype individual is not destroyed.  After the transporter 
completes its work, you have two, numerically distinct 
individuals, one in Kirchberg and the other on Altair-4. 
Transporter Scenario 2: 
 Chuck steps into the send-booth of a 
teletransporter in Kirchberg. 
 Chuck is encoded, but not disintegrated, in 
the send-booth. 
 Chuck steps back out of the send-booth. 
 An exact replica of Chuck, Dopple-Chuck, 
steps out of the receive-booth on Altair-4. 
 Dopple-Chuck is completely similar to the 
individual who entered the send-booth regarding both 
physical and psychological characteristics (for instance, he 
has the same fingerprints, DNA structure, and stomach 
contents;  he also has the same memories and 
personality). 
 It seems to Dopple-Chuck as though he is 
the same person who entered the send-booth. 
 A deputation of colleagues is sent to Altair-
4 by conventional means.  They find that Dopple-Chuck is 
exactly as though he had traveled from Kirchberg to Altair-
4 by conventional means. 
We can remove the illusion that any traveling is 
accomplished with a transporter by drastically reducing the 
distance between the send and receive-booths.  Place 
them both right here, within the same room, just a meter 
apart.  Now we have a device that is analogous to a copy 
machine instead of a FAX machine. 
Transporter Scenario 3: 
 Chuck steps into the send-booth of a 
teletransporter in Kirchberg with a stout rope tied around 
his waist. The rope is firmly held by a delegation of his 
colleagues and friends. 
 The receive-booth is located one meter 
from the send-booth 
 Chuck is encoded, but not disintegrated, in 
the send-booth. 
 Chuck steps back out of the send-booth, 
with the rope still tied around his waist and firmly held by 
his colleagues and friends. 
 An exact replica of Chuck, Dopple-Chuck, 
steps out of the receive-booth one meter away. 
 Dopple-Chuck is completely similar to the 
individual who entered the send-booth regarding both 
physical and psychological characteristics (for instance, he 
has the same fingerprints, DNA structure, and stomach 
contents;  he also has the same memories and 
personality). 
 It seems to Dopple-Chuck as though he is 
the same person who entered the send-booth. 
 A delegation of Chuck’s colleagues, still 
holding the rope, which remains tied to Chuck’s waist, 
sees Chuck to their left and Dopple-Chuck to their right.  
The delegation counts two numerically distinct individuals. 
 Chuck meets Dopple-Chuck.   
Both objective and subjective criteria show that the 
prototype person is not the same person as the duplicate.  
The objective case is easiest.  Witnesses keep track of 
which one is the original by means of the stout rope.  
Moreover, they can readily observe that the original is to 
the left of the duplicate.  Leibniz knew that locational 
properties were among the characteristics we use to 
distinguish between distinct individuals.  It is insightful that, 
in transporter scenarios, the locational differences are 
more obvious when the two individuals are in the same 
room than when they are on difference planets. 
Subjective criteria are more intriguing.  First, the 
fact that it seems to the duplicate that he is the same 
person who entered the send-booth proves nothing.  
Seeming is not a viable criterion for correctness.  ”It 
seemed to me at the time that I was correct,” usually 
implies that I was not correct.  If my ”seeming” impression 
gains its force  from comparing me with myself itself, then 
it is not trustworthy, no matter how psychologically 
compelling it is.  The standard meter rod cannot be used to 
measure its own length.  (PI, 50) Lewis Carroll’s Alice 
cannot figure out whether she is shrinking or growing by 
placing her hand on top of her own head.  An independent 
standard is needed to determine sameness. 
Wittgenstein’s remarks concerning the 
”metaphysical I” from the Tractatus are helpful at this point.  
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Similar observations were made by Leibniz and Gershon 
Weiler.  A person can be identified by his physical 
characteristics including his memories, personality, and his 
relationships with other persons.  However, a person can 
also be identified in terms of his point of view.  Points of 
view are unique.  Only I can have my perspective on my 
world of experience (that is what makes it mine).  Just as a 
camera can take photographs of other cameras, but it 
cannot take a picture of itself, so too, I can meet other 
persons, but I cannot meet myself.  If I meet another 
person at all, that suffices to show that the other person is 
not me.  ”I am my world.”  (Tractatus, 5.63) ”. . . the 
metaphysical subject [is] the limit of the world – not a part 
of it.”  (Tractatus, 5.641) Dopple-Chuck is a part of my 
world.  My world would come to an end, if I were 
disintegrated back in the send-booth.  (Tractatus, 6.431)  
Since I can meet my duplicate in the third transporter 
scenario, he is not me.  The moment Dopple-Chuck steps 
out of the receive-booth, his experiences, history, and 
viewpoint differ from mine.  He becomes an external fact in 
my world, and I become one in his. 
No one I have asked would be willing to use a 
functioning, reliable transporter as a means of 
transportation.  They feared that using a transporter 
involves death and duplication.  If you were the prototype 
in Transporter Scenario 3, when you stepped back out of 
the send-booth, would you be willing to have yourself killed 
and permit your duplicate to carry on with the rest of your 
life?  Would you cheerfully let him share love with your 
partner, possess your belongings, interact with your 
friends, and enjoy  the loyalty of your dog?  Would it matter 
to you?  If so, then the transported duplicate is not you. 
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